Charles Kenneth Roberts

Politics, History, Culture

AI enthusiasts want to destroy the good

If you encourage the use of AI because you think that it is going to make everyone’s lives better, eventually creating a post-scarcity utopia, that’s fine. I think you’re probably wrong, but that’s OK. As I’ve said before, I don’t think we need AI to fix most of our existing problems, and there’s very little that’s happened in the use of AI so far which suggests society-wide positive changes, but unless you’re using the promise of future AI solutions to avoid solving problems today, or something like that, then I think there’s nothing particularly harmful about believing that AI is going to make us into Star Trek society.

Sam Altman text saying that ChatGPT can make a podcast so you don't have to talk to your children

If you are enthusiastic about the use of AI because you think it has some specific and valuable (if limited) uses, even if there’s a lot of slop or jobs that are lost (because after all the same thing happened with previous technological innovations large and small, and nobody says we shouldn’t have invented the printing press just because most published material is bad), that’s OK, too. I’m not as confident that AI is going to massively overhaul the economy any time soon, but there are some places that AI and even specifically LLMs seem useful. “We’re going to get much more effective scheduling apps, search engines, and the like”–OK, that’s fine.

Screenshot from a Bittany Ellich post where she says AI means she can think less about her children.

What we actually seem to get from the most vocal proponents of AI use: let’s talk to our kids less. Let’s think about our kids less. Let’s have AI make our movies and our visual art.

Maybe people wouldn’t think “AI enthusiasts oppose what’s good and important about being human beings” if AI enthusiasts didn’t say “Great, AI can replace what’s good about important about being human beings!”

You don’t have to take people in the Dumb Takes Industry seriously

Tyler Austin Harper is a former environmental studies professor whose main job now is complaining about how American higher education has become too woke. I see people discussing his ideas on social media, like the screenshot above, where Harper is complaining about something.

Harper is not a serious commenter, and you shouldn’t take him seriously. Anyone who thinks social justice faculty activism is anywhere on the list of major problems with American higher education is someone who is either uninformed, stupid, or lying, and they don’t deserve your serious attention (in the case of Harper, it seems to me that he’s a guy with some good ideas who has realized he can make a lot more money and get a lot more attention by pushing dumb ideas he may or may not even believe).

None of these people deserve your attention. When Nate Silver or Matt Yglesias or whoever posts some goofy nonsense online, we don’t have to all pretend that this is an important topic to discuss or that it needs consideration and careful rebuttal. We don’t have to take incoherent, bad-faith argument seriously. The Atlantic thinks (correctly!) it can reassure muddled bigots and trick people into clicking on bad articles by dishonest people. But we can prove them wrong. Let’s all agree, together, to stop treating these kinds of internet personalities like serious thinkers who merit any meaningful attention at all, much less people who should be driving the discourse around important topics.

We don’t really need grades as they exist anymore

The Harvard Crimson headline “70% of Faculty Vote to Overhaul Harvard Grading With A Cap” sums it up: Harvard University faculty voted, beginning in Fall 2027, to cap the number of students receiving an A in courses at about 20% (with some wiggle room). To go along with that, GPA will be replaced by percentile rankings in various internal awards. A survey of students suggests near-total opposition, with 85% of students disapproving.

(Ignoring that everyone should stop talking about Ivies all time whenever we discussion higher education in the USA,) There’s some things about this that I like. The idea that a B or C might as well be failing is a harmful expectation, and the expectation that everyone can or should get an A is a norm I’d like to see changed. Grade inflation is genuinely happening across much of American higher education, including apparently at Harvard. There was a report last year that most grades at Harvard were As, and it seems unlikely that the average Harvard student has gotten so much better in the last couple of decades as to explain the trend solely through academic improvement. It would be good if the expectation becomes that getting an A is unusual or exceptional, that there’s nothing wrong with not getting an A, and that students with a B or C average will probably be fine after graduation.

This isn’t a perfect implementation, though, and I’m not sure I’d want my employer to introduce a similar policy. Especially with smaller classes, sometimes you just get better groups of students. I suppose the argument is that a class where more than one in five is A material is too unlikely to be a concern. That makes sense for 300-person classes, but I’m not sure about classes of 30 or 20 or 10, especially upper-level classes in difficult fields which have already done a fair bit of weeding out weaker students just to get there. And for at least some classes in disciplines with more objective measures (like mathematics), exams set to a common standard should be able to create a fair grade distribution that doesn’t require any kind of percentile ranking.

This decision raises a bigger, more fundamental question. What’s the point of grades? Grades are supposed to evaluate students, but the kind of grade inflation common in so many schools seems to me to indicate that they aren’t terribly useful for that purpose. Grades are motivation for students in only the worst way, external validation replacing intrinsic motivation. They are a blunt tool for measuring student learning, and other forms of feedback are much more useful.

It’s not obvious what grades are even supposed to be doing, when we use terms like “evaluate” or “measure.” Are grades a certification that students have met a certain standard? Are they feedback for students, for parents, for employers or application committees? For my history classes, which aren’t particularly unusual that I can tell, a student’s final grade reflects a fuzzy combination of student effort and improvement, soft skills like turning work in on time or attending class, and actual content mastery. (And no matter what people say, it’s very rare that someone genuinely thinks a final grade should reflect content expertise–you don’t think there should be late penalties?) I’m not quite a grade abolitionist or radical ungrader, but it’s hard to imagine that we would create anything like the same grading system for high school and undergraduate education that we have today, if starting from scratch.

There would be some slight difficulties, especially for external purposes (“List your GPA”-type applications), but I would mostly do away with letter grades, if I were in charge. Classes instead should be graded Unsatisfactory (earning no credit), Satisfactory, and Excellent, with a soft cap on the number of Excellent students for each class (perhaps the faculty member would have to write an explanation of giving more than 5% of a class/students taught in a semester a grade of Excellent, or having an objective exam/set of exams with an Excellent cut-off of a score that historically only 5% or fewer of students get). At smaller institutions, the expectation would be that most students will receive a Satisfactory and that more classes would have no grades of Excellent than would have multiple ones.

For most people, what’s the purpose of going to college? It’s to get a degree, which serves as testimony of being educated, in the sense that you prove you can follow directions, show up at least some of the time, not prove to be so incompetent or objectionable that you get kicked out of school, and the like. If we think about a college degree in the most mercenary sense, entirely in terms of preparation for future employment, then it really isn’t necessary to differentiate between A, B, C, and D if prove you can get through college effectively (or at least consistently above a failing level) for most people. Will some people put in less effort or produce lower quality work than they might under a traditional grading system? They might, but lots of people already put in less effort or produce lower work than they’re capable of doing.

From my fluffier the-humanities-really-matter perspective, starting class with the expectation that most people are going to pass, we can instead concentrate on actually learning instead of trying to quantify everyone’s contributions on an arbitrary scale. Students can replace a focus on grades with a focus on learning.

“Young people need to vote” is the “Poor people shouldn’t get Starbucks” of political advice

A common response to All The Bad Stuff going on in American politics today is to blame young nonvoters, or to say that just getting young voters to turn out will solve our problems, like the replies to this Bluesky post making the good point that we’ve had decades of presidents born in 1946. But telling young people to vote, or blaming America’s political problems on young nonvoters, is like telling poor people to stop getting Starbucks or stop buying cigarettes if they want to afford a house someday. It may be good advice, and it’s entirely possible you know someone personally for whom this would be a useful course of action. But in most cases, it’s not helpful to say that, and it won’t really solve the problem. Poor people aren’t poor, generally speaking, because they waste money on minor frivolities and pleasures. There are deeper structural issues this kind of advice misses. For politics, unrepresentative districts, obstacles to voting, and a lack of real choice means that young people who decide not to vote are in many cases making a reasonable choice, or at least an understandable one. We need to fix that before we start blaming young nonvoters for America’s problems.

A graph showing that more eligible voters did not vote than voted for Trump or Harris in 2024.

Does your vote even matter? Mine doesn’t. I live in Alabama. My vote doesn’t have any impact on most state and federal elections. Donald Trump won not quite 2/3 of the votes in Alabama. I live in Alabama’s most competitive congressional district from the 2024 elections, District 2, which was a nine-point victory for the Democrats. Even the close races in Alabama aren’t close. Most congressional districts in the USA are safe districts, and most states are safe states for one of the two major parties. Less than 16% of congressional races in 2024 were decided by 10 points or less, with a slightly more competitive 32% of Senate races decided by 10 points or less and 27% of electoral votes for president from states or districts decided by 10 points or less. If you live in a relatively small number of states or congressional districts, your vote for Congress or the Senate or the presidency or governor matters. But for me, it doesn’t, and for most people voting in the United States, it doesn’t.

It’s true that your vote has more impact on races further down the ballot. You might realistically expect to help decide who your city council representative or state secretary of agriculture is. I guess we could hope to live in a world where everyone is expected to have knowledge about and a strong opinion on 10 or 20 or 30 different elections every couple of years, but we don’t. The political system is intentionally designed to blunt democracy, and complaining about people not voting in a system that discourages them to vote is missing the real issue.

Not only discouraging: the USA has a number of obstacles actively hindering voting and which tend to hit younger voters (who are also typically poorer) harder. Voting places are not always easily accessible, and the hours available to vote might not fit busy work or family schedules. Many states have intentionally difficult systems of absentee balloting or other means of voter suppression which discourage turnout.

Even if you live in a state where your vote matters, and which makes it easy for you to vote, you might have trouble finding any value in voting anyway. The United States has a relatively wide, in American terms, ideological distance between the major parties right now, but I sympathize–even as I disagree–with people who feel like there is no real choice. There was a lot of hullabaloo, for example, about voters in the Midwest who refused to vote for Kamala Harris because of what’s going on in Gaza and the American role in it. Things probably would be better for people in Gaza if the Democrats had won, but I’m not going to tell voters that they were foolish to vote for candidates who promised to make things bad, but maybe not as bad, for their relatives, or who were hesitant to support a party which went out of its way to emphasize that its leaders consider the idea that Arabs in Palestine should be treated like human beings to be a ridiculous notion. There’s a good philosophical and practical case for voting for the lesser of two evils, but it still means voting for an evil, and I don’t expect anyone to do that. It’s unfair for anyone else to expect that, either.

I think people should vote. I think we should encourage young people to vote. I’m well out of the “young voter” category, but I got up early Election Day morning in 2024 so I could go and vote, knowing that my vote had no meaningful impact on the outcome of any of the races in which I voted. I vote and encourage everyone, including young people, to vote, but acting like everyone (especially young people) getting out to vote is going to solve the problems is mistaken. It’s bad advice, and more than that, it’s probably counterproductive, the sort of hectoring nagging that turns people off of politics. Don’t blame people for failing to meaningfully participate in a system which makes it difficult to meaningfully participate in a system.

Indiana football and a better future

It’s not a great time to be in the United States, and it’s hard to be hopeful about the future. I was trying to pick an example of all the bad things going on, and I don’t know if the situation with ICE or Greenland or RFK Jr. or something else is going to prove to be worst of The Horrors we see every day. But we should try to be optimistic; things can be better, even things that seem impossible. For proof, just look at the Indiana University football team, which last night won its first national title. 

Indiana football used to be shorthand for being terrible. They were the first college football program to lose 700 games (and as of this season still one of only three schools to do so). It was well into this season that they stopped having the most losses in history, with fellow Big Ten conference member Northwestern now taking a slight lead. And Northwestern still has about fifty more victories than Indiana does, to go with their three more losses; only Wake Forest currently has a worse all-time win percentage among major conference teams.

In 1976, then-head coach Lee Corso supposedly called a timeout so he could take a team picture of the scoreboard, not in a victory over Ohio State, but taking a 7-6 lead, in a game that Ohio State ended up winning 47-7. Whether or not that story is true, it captures the futility of Indiana football. Indiana is historically one of a handful of the worst programs in the sport, one of the schools you would use as a joke. Until about December, it was a reasonable argument that they were the worst program in the history of major college football. Now they are national champions.

More than that: Indiana has a claim on the greatest season in college football history. I don’t think they’re the best team ever (NIL and other changes make it harder to stockpile talent the way teams even five years ago could), but “greatest” is not synonymous with “best.” Indiana is 16-0. And not only did Indiana win the national title, that they did it in decisive and some might say historic fashion. Indiana only won four games by less than at least two scores. The only game that they didn’t feel like definitively the better team was the national title game, an evenly-match contest decided in part because of a blocked punt. Including the Big Ten title game, Indiana’s postseason schedule was against all the different kinds of college football elite it could be against. They beat the two best programs from both a recent and long term perspective (Ohio State and Alabama), the new new money elite (Oregon), and the old new money elite (Miami); two of those games were I-don’t-need-to-watch-the-rest-of-this blowouts. If it were a movie, it would not be particularly believable. If it were a video game, you’d call it proof the game is unrealistic.

And yet it happened. Indiana, of all places, is proof that better things are possible.

Unconvincing arguments about foreign enrollment

Historian David A. Bell argues that Trump may have a point in wanting to reduce foreign enrollment at colleges and universities in the USA, arguing that high international enrollment harms the mission of universities as “engines of social mobility and national unity.” Elite schools have not raised their enrollments meaningfully in decades, so the more foreign students we have, the fewer American-born students are enrolled. Bell is in part inspired by other scholars tweeting that American universities have failed, to at least some degree, to address the needs of non-elite Americans. It’s weird to cite Adrian Vermeule arguing that universities are not “open to the Other America, which they have mocked and despised for decades” because that’s a bunch of silly nonsense. But even the better arguments about foreign enrollment are unconvincing at best. People who argue for any merit in Trump’s effort to reduce the enrollment of foreign students at American colleges and universities are wrong that the Trump Administration or those in its orbit have any interest in making higher education better, and they’re wrong that reducing foreign enrollment is in any meaningful way an effective approach to solving the numerous problems in American education.

It’s particularly off-base to call this any kind of “policy,” like Daniel Steinmetz-Jenkins does. He tweets, “there’s something critical to be said about a neoliberal circulation of international elites at prestigious American universities that middle and working class students could never afford outside of student loans and grants,” which has some merit, but then goes on, “It’s a shame that such reforms couldn’t take place with a Democrat in office rather than the current authoritarian one and his America first ideology,” which is wildly wrong, approaching so-wrong-it’s-not-really-even-wrong territory. Does Steinmetz-Jenkins really think that either the goal or the outcome will be to open up a lot of new spots to American students? This whole argument is being made on a foundation made of sand. People who want to eliminate foreign enrollment aren’t doing it to make education more widely available or fairer; it’s a step in reducing access to higher education altogether. The goal isn’t to make higher education more equitable, but to reserve even more pieces of a dwindling pie for the existing elite.

As I’ve written before, the real culprits taking away spots from deserving students at elite institutions are the children of donors and legacy admissions. Bell argues that accepting upper-class foreign students reduces the kind of diversity we would get from working-class Americans, as though the slots taken by foreign students would be reserved for poor people, instead of going to the children of the American elite instead of the children of the Chinese (or wherever) elite. He writes that upper-class foreign “students make U.S. universities look even more elite and possibly out of touch” at a time when higher education is under attack, but there’s no meaningful reason to believe that the student body would become more egalitarian without foreigners. I guess native-born elites are better than foreign-born elites to some people, but I’m not terribly interested in conceding any ground to xenophobes or other kinds of bigots.

The notion that social mobility depends on attending elite institutions is also incorrect. For all the claimed concern for rural or working class Americans, this line of thought emerges from a national elite-centered perspective. Bell mentioned a hypothetical student from rural Alabama, and I’ve lived almost my entire life in Alabama, so some relevant individuals: The richest person in Alabama, Jimmy Rane, got his undergraduate degree from Auburn University and his JD from Samford. Our senators attended the University of Alabama (both BS and JD for Katie Britt) and what’s now Southern Arkansas University (a BS for Tommy Tuberville). Alabama’s congressional delegation (in order of district) received undergraduate degrees from Auburn University, the University of Alabama, Jacksonville State University, Birmingham-Southern College, Athens State University, the University of Alabama, and Princeton University. You can be successful in Alabama by attending almost any kind of institution. You might not become a professor at an Ivy League school without attending a different Ivy League school, but that’s a different problem.

Thinking specifically about graduate studies (which I don’t generally think of as “engines of social mobility,” in Bell’s phrase, for most people), I can’t think of a single problem with graduate education that would best be solved, or even usefully addressed, by reducing foreign enrollment. If underserving foreign applicants are taking spots from more deserving native-born applicants because of the cost, then again, the solution is to reduce the cost of graduate education; otherwise, you’re replacing rich foreign students with rich native-born students (which is the actual goal of many of the people pushing these policies). It’s true that graduate school is too expensive, but that’s not because of foreigners, any more than it’s because of out-of-state students, and blaming foreign students is both incorrect and enormously distasteful. Policymakers aren’t going to fix the student loan crisis if we ban foreign graduate students; it’s absurd to conclude otherwise.

The problem here isn’t foreign enrollment in elite universities; the problem is the notion that elite universities are and/or should be the only avenue of social mobility. People who attend Ivy League and Ivy League-esque institutions are very smart. But there are very smart people at state universities and liberal arts colleges, too. Is it easier to become president or a Fortune 500 CEO if you attend Harvard? Probably. But rather than blame foreign immigrants for that, maybe we should be putting less emphasis on graduating from an elite institution; kicking out Chinese and Indian students isn’t going to fix American credentialism.

There are all kinds of problems with the way that higher educations, especially elite higher education, works in this country. Foreign students are not one of them.

We don’t need AI to solve our problems

Sam Altman posted “The Gentle Singularity” with the opening, “We are past the event horizon; the takeoff has started. Humanity is close to building digital superintelligence”. He promises a future of AI robots who can “can operate the entire supply chain” and one in which “the world will be getting so much richer so quickly that we’ll be able to seriously entertain new policy ideas we never could before”.

I have two problems with this perspective. I’m not very qualified to weigh in too much on the first, the optimism about the technological improvements. But I do know, for an objective fact, that LLMs/AIs give incorrect answers to basic factual questions, and that people are relying on AI to produce answers in a way that is harmful. I also know, for an objective fact, that even if AI improves its accuracy, it still depends and will depend for the foreseeable future on the work of thousands and thousands and thousands of uncompensated human beings. I’m not optimistic that AI will, in the near future, be as useful as its proponents argue; it’s certainly not as useful today as its boosters claim.

But ignoring all that: the bigger problem with the promise of AI as an answer to all our problems is that we mostly don’t need AI to answer all of our problems. The average net worth of an American household is over a million dollars, but the median is below $200,000. There’s plenty of wealth out there already! We have reached a level of prosperity to, in theory, fairly easily solve most of our major social problems. What we do instead is throw money away in gigantic wasteful ways: inefficient healthcare, inefficient transportation and infrastructure, inequality and pointless makework. Given all the different ways to solve crime, we choose the most painful and costly approach. The USA has a remarkable bad track record on these things, being perhaps the only country in the world rich enough to be wrong so often and yet still do so well.

Right now, Donald Trump is enacting a hugely expensive, pointless, and cruel program aimed at deporting or driving out immigrants from the United States. He is planning to spend at least $134 million to repress protests in Los Angeles against it. Instead of harnessing the economic and cultural benefits of immigration, we do what we’ve been doing for over a century: spending unimaginable amounts of money to be uselessly harmful. Even if AI makes us so rich that most people don’t need to do meaningful amounts of unpleasant work, we’re already so rich that most people don’t need to do meaningful amounts of unpleasant work, and we responded by attacking vaccination, the greatest medical innovation in human history.

We don’t need AI to do most of the good things Altman describes in his post. We already know how to create pleasant, low-stress, high-leisure lives for most Americans. We just choose not to.

Thinking about a post-Trump GOP

There’s a detailed analysis of the 2024 election out from Catalist. The conclusion is that Donald Trump’s victory can’t be attributed to a single important demographic or electoral shift, but rather is the result of a collection of changes. The executive summary notes:

Overall, we find that the Democratic Kamala Harris / Tim Walz ticket retained key parts of the Biden 2020 coalition, but at lower levels among a specific, interconnected set of subgroups, including young voters, men, voters of color, less frequent voters, urban voters, and voters living outside the major battleground states. No single demographic characteristic explains all the dynamics of the election; rather we find that the election is best explained as a combination of related factors. Importantly, an overarching connection among these groups is that they are less likely to have cast ballots in previous elections and are generally less engaged in the political process.  

This makes sense, fitting with previous data and what I’ve observed. I think it’s worth contrasting Trump’s base and his voters; the people who are strong Trump supporters are very different from the less-engaged, less-motivated group that gave him the election. After decades as one of the famous rich guys in the country, especially during his run as host of The Apprentice, Donald Trump is an emblem for a certain kind of self-consciously vulgar American wealth. He’s the no-nonsense business mogul who says “You’re fired!” People who don’t think about politics until they get to the voting booth have that image of Trump. I think there are ways for the Democrats to address it, but Democrats didn’t or couldn’t effectively do anything about it between 2020 and 2024. Harris ran a mediocre-to-bad campaign, undermined by Biden’s decision to run and then not run and his administration’s hesitancy to more effectively pursue criminal charges against Trump or other figures from his administration. Beyond that, Harris was tied to popular perceptions about inflation and leftover Covid-19 complaints. But she/the Democrats also failed to successfully erode the most important part of Trump’s electability.

Related to his almost magical appeal to low-information voters, Trump is extremely effective in the current media environment. He’s good at TV and the internet, and he has a dedicated major news outlet (Fox) and several dedicated minor ones (Newsmax etc). Despite Trump being in American politics for over a decade, what’s left of establishment media doesn’t really know how to handle him or deal with him. Newer forms of media like podcasts and short internet videos (currently TikTok, who knows what in the future) seem, for a variety of reasons, better suited to both his style and content of politics.

The Catalist report got me thinking about is the future. Donald Trump seems uniquely capable of winning the presidency as a Republican, an environment which even with likely Republican-friendly census changes in 2030 seems to me to favor the Democrats (in contrast to the House and especially Senate, where Democrats are going to be in trouble). Republicans have won a majority of the popular vote in a presidential election exactly one time (2004) since George H.W. Bush’s 1988 victory. Republicans have won a plurality of the popular vote in two (2004, 2024) out of the last nine elections. George W. Bush won what was basically a tie in 2000, and Trump won in something of a freak occurrence in 2016.

Many of the things that have benefited Donald Trump seem to be contradictory to national success for almost any other Republican. The “anti-woke” nonsense that is necessary for somebody like Ron DeSantis in Florida makes him a less effective national candidate. High-profile figures in the Trump administration (Kristi Noem, J.D. Vance, Marco Rubio) have limited appeal at best, and Trump’s record of turnovers makes it unclear whether they’ll even be his favorites in a few years. Maybe Vance can figure out how to be Trump’s successor, but consider me doubtful. Nobody in the federal government has the juice that Trump has today, much less that Trump had in 2016. Some Republican governors might be able to finesse the line of being just the right degree of being associated with Trump without getting any of the negative, but with Trump taking up all the oxygen for Republicans, it will be hard to stake out a spot as an independent brand. The Democrats have some nutty options for the 2028 nomination, too (Rahm Emanuel, Andrew Cuomo), and there’s no guarantee they will pick well–Donald Trump and the Republicans are broadly unpopular, but the Democrats as a party are broadly unpopular, too–but the Democratic bench overall looks much deeper.

There is a certain kind of low-engagement voter, the kind of voter who thinks the president can bring back their favorite chain restaurant or change which NFL game gets the national broadcast, or the kind of voter who gets a significant portion of their political knowledge from memes on Facebook or YouTube videos. Trump appears to be uniquely capable of getting to them (a power that has become even more important as traditional sources of news become less and less important) with a combination of charisma, reputation, and reactionary populism. After Trump, is there any reason to think another Republican will be able to recreate the magic and tap into that voter group?

I still don’t understand what AI is supposed to do for me

“Now, instead of a professor lecturing about historical facts — because those are all in the textbook — they can instead focus on things like, ‘How do we think about this particular text?’ and ‘How can we think about it differently?’ And that’s how critical thinking starts to happen.”

There’s a bit of a to-do around an AI-produced textbook for a literature class at UCLA. I think there’s something to be said about how this professor might be undermining colleagues by creating an AI class that can replace other faculty, or about the influence of tech money in academia, or a lot of other things. But when I read the article, my only conclusion was angry bafflement. I still don’t understand what AI is supposed to actually do for most faculty–I keep seeing a lot of AI smoke, but I haven’t found the fire yet.

The description of this class confuses me. Did this professor not already assign primary sources, which I would assume are freely available if they’re being put together into this textbook that will be sold to students? Are there not already lesson plans? Isn’t the idea of a flipped classroom older than Ace Ventura: Pet Detective? Isn’t part of the advantage of having different people teach the same class that you can have a different viewpoint?

I don’t even understand it as a cost-saving or moneymaking project. Professors already make course packets which they can require students to purchase. They can even get graduate students to make the course packets, so the professors don’t have to do the work. According to the article, a class like this takes four months to make and has a team of people vetting and refining, which sounds like they could have just had people make the textbook.

Somebody could make a nefarious argument that this is a way to sneak AI into the ivory tower, or that this is giving undeserved prestige to an operation that will hopefully make money in other ways, or whatever. I have no doubt that administrators at big universities are looking to create zombie ChatGPT classes in which they can pay adjuncts $600 to enter the grades. But the easiest explanation is this: AI garbage is everywhere because it’s trendy. You can toss this slop out, and people will eat it up. “Professor gives students a course reader” doesn’t get you in the news. I would guess this professor is smart and soulless enough to know how the game is played, but Zrinka Stahuljak might be caught up in the hype as much as anyone. Maybe someone who teaches at UCLA, which has a decidedly a research-driven hiring and promotion process, really thinks that analyzing a text in class instead of telling students a list of facts is cutting edge teaching. Maybe “I’m doing this because this is what Cool Smart People do” is the entire explanation.

I still don’t understand what any of this does for actual professors teaching actual classes. Besides showing off how tech-savvy I am at pointless crap, what would doing something like this do for my classes, or for anyone’s class? I don’t want to be in a newsletter for spending a lot of money on makework, so what lesson am I to draw from this?

If we’re going to keep talking about AI, I want it to do something, even if it’s evil. It would have been more realistic for them to make six Terminator movies where everybody just talks about Skynet disrupting the genocide market.

Birmingham-Southern’s closure has lessons

My alma mater, Birmingham-Southern College, announced yesterday that it is closing. May 31 will be the last day of operation. This is a tremendous loss for the students, employees, and alumni of BSC, as well as for the state of Alabama. There are numerous things that higher education should take from its experience.

Perhaps the most obvious lesson is the importance of college leadership. I don’t know if I would quite go this far, but BSC’s closure could be attributed entirely to mismanagement of the college in the early 2000s. The biggest blow came in 2010, when it was revealed that Birmingham-Southern had been erroneously giving millions of dollars of financial aid that the federal government wasn’t reimbursing, costing something like $5 million a year. I don’t claim to be an accountant, but it looks like at a minimum shady reporting practices kept the oversized Board of Trustees and campus community in the dark. This happened at the same time that then-president David Pollick had gone on a spending spree with the goal of increasing enrollment (which apparently worked, but BSC was spending more money than the students it attracted were paying). This big spending continued even as the 2008 financial crisis left numerous colleges in dire financial straits. Once everything came out, things looked bad: BSC had spent years spending money it didn’t have in the worst economy for higher education in decades (probably the worst since modern American higher education emerged after World War II). The revolving door of presidents who followed didn’t help–from my interested but distant perspective, I was impressed by Charles Krulak, but even competent presidents who stay only a short time will cause instability. Not counting two interims, BSC has had four presidents since Pollick resigned in 2010.

I thought BSC’s public announcement in 2022 that the College would close in 2023 without massive support was also a serious misstep. College finances don’t just get so bad that there’s a one-year deadline, and the sudden declaration only worsened the sense of instability. Student interest understandably dipped. Why would a high school senior want to attend a school that might close their sophomore year of college? Once you start saying “we might have to close,” it’s often as good as saying, “we’re going to close.”

Another lesson here is that we live in an increasingly anti-education political environment, and colleges can’t (and haven’t for a while been able to) count on government support. The Alabama legislature passed a loan program that would have saved BSC, but Alabama’s awful state treasurer, the absurdly-named Young Boozer III, denied the request–the authors of the original loan program specifically said that Boozer misinterpreted their bill. A bill trying to remove Boozer from the process is failing, which is why BSC has announced it is closing.

Critics of the loan, like Boozer, are right that BSC had mismanaged its finances, but that hasn’t stopped the government from funding or bailing out countless private businesses over the years. Just one Alabama program, Innovate Alabama, has given over $10 million to small businesses since 2020. Look at all the different ways you can get tax credits for businesses in Alabama (a tax credit or abatement being functionally the same as a check from the government). If a non-union car manufacturer wanted a $30 million loan to create over 300 jobs, the state would say yes; it won’t save 300 existing jobs at a college. Alabama is building the most expensive prison in American history, costing over a billion dollars. Two state senators wrote that BSC provides $91 million a year in economic activity for the state of Alabama (some estimates are even higher). Based on this estimate, they say the life of the loan would generate $2 billion in economic activity for Alabama. Even if they’re overstating things by tenfold, a loan would more than pay for itself. The state of Alabama can obviously afford to save BSC.

But this isn’t about dollars and cents. I don’t need to talk about what’s going on in Florida, Georgia, Virginia, or other states that are trying to dismantle the world’s best system of higher education. Especially in states like Alabama, the lesson for colleges is that you’re on your own. The result is that Alabama, and Birmingham in particular, will lose one of its best colleges.

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